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CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTS AND THE MUTATION EFFECT
HORAcIO SPECTOR*
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with legal transplantation, that is, the borrow-
ing of legal institutions from foreign jurisdictions.1 Constitutional trans-
plants are a species of legal transplants. By constitutional transplants, I
mean both the borrowing of constitutional texts from foreign jurisdictions
and the borrowing of judicial doctrines espoused in precedents from for-
eign supreme courts or constitutional courts. In general, borrowing of
precedents is more likely when there has been a prior transplantation of
constitutional texts, though this is by no means necessary.
There is a trend in literature that regards transplantation of constitu-
tional texts with great skepticism. Frederick Schauer suggests that political,
social, and cultural factors tend to impede constitutional borrowing. With
regards to the Estonian experience, Schauer says that "to have an American
constitution is quite different and would suggest a loss of sovereignty, con-
trol, and much of the essence of what helps to constitute a nation as a na-
tion in the first place."' 2 In the same vein, Keith Rosenn and Carlos
Rosenkrantz are critical of the transplantation of constitutional models into
Latin America. For Rosenn, factors such as concentration of land owner-
ship and inexperience with self-government have led to the failure of con-
stitutionalism in Latin America. 3 From a political and philosophical stance,
Rosenkrantz claims that cultural heterogeneity and the democratic ideal of
self-government make constitutional transplantation undesirable. 4 Against
this skepticism, and using the case of constitutional transplantation in Ar-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires (Argentina).
1, For the concept of legal transplants, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21-30 (2d ed. 1993). A helpful typology of transplants can be found
in Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine
Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (2003).
2. Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in GOVERNANCE IN
A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 257 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
3. Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin
America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (1990).
4. Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law,
I INT'L J. CONST. L. 269, 288-89 (2003).
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gentina, I will argue that the borrowing of constitutional texts can be suc-
cessful over long periods of time, and that when the transplanted texts fail,
this failure is not easily attributable to transplantation alone.
A second goal of this paper is to introduce the notion of "mutation ef-
fect" to the theoretical analyses of judicial transplants. 5 By "mutation" of
precedents, I mean the process of continuing to extend the scope of a hold-
ing, regardless of its factual basis, to cover situations not even contem-
plated in the reasoning that grounded the original decision. The eminent
Argentine jurist, Genaro Carri6, noted this phenomenon with respect to the
handling of autochthonous precedents. Carri6 suggested that this kind of
mutation results from two intellectual traits associated with Argentine civil-
ian culture: (1) a lack of training in judicial interpretation, and (2) an urge
toward abstractness. Carri6 is worth quoting:
We have not developed, however, a good technique for rightly founding
a ruling on precedents. We have not been, nor are we, trained in the han-
dling of precedents as source of decisions. We are skilful, instead, in
handling statutes. Instead of analyzing the facts of prior cases to estab-
lish, with the greatest possible precision, what the holding of the decision
was, we prefer to deduce the solution to the problem at stake from loose
paragraphs, more often than not taken out of context. 6
Carri6 describes the civilian urge toward abstractness in the following
terms:
There is a sort of urge toward abstractness, a wish to surpass the limits of
the case's facts, using them as springboard to jump to constructions of
great scope.... For this reason, when we have to deal with norms that
have arisen out of the contact with facts, we hasten to cut the umbilical
cord that bound them up with the latter, and we finally remain with the
norm as an independent and autonomous bearer of meaning. This disdain
for the facts of the case involves serious risks. If we abstract from the
norms created by the courts the indispensable factual references that
shaped their birth, and, along with it, their meaning, there is the danger
that the pure norm resulting from this process of abstraction will be later
utilized as point of departure for a new series of deductions that, relieved
now from any factual control, will likely lead anywhere.7
In the quoted passages Carri6 refers to the mutation of local prece-
dents. As used in this paper, the label "mutation effect" denotes the muta-
tion of transplanted precedents-i.e., foreign precedents. While Carri6's
intellectual explanation might work well in relation to domestic precedents,
I do not think that this is the best explanation of the mutation effect (though
5. The word "mutation" was suggested to me by Eduardo Baistrocchi.
6. GENARO R. CARRI6, RECURSO DE AMPARO Y TtCNICA JUDICIAL 174 (2d ed. 1987) (unless
otherwise noted, all translations herein are the author's own).
7. Id. at 177. 1 am grateful to Alberto Garay for referring me to Carri6's book in this connection.
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I concede that this explanation could be partially relevant). Instead, I con-
tend that the mutation effect occurs when a supreme court or a constitu-
tional tribunal stretches borrowed precedents, without due consideration to
their factual bases, in order to legitimize heterodox interpretations of its
Constitution. When a supreme court claims that a new situation falls under
the borrowed precedent, it seeks to extend the authority or persuasive force
of the precedent to the new ruling. This extension is made by interpreting
the precedent in such a broad form that the new ruling looks to be just an
implication of the precedent. In this way, the decision is vindicated by a
distorted varient of the original precedent.
I will demonstrate the mutation effect by using the doctrine of eco-
nomic emergency, as invoked by the Argentine Supreme Court to justify
the government's expropriations of bank deposits. We will see that this
doctrine was inflated beyond its original scope of application to cover fac-
tual situations that the U.S. Supreme Court did not contemplate. By invok-
ing this doctrine to justify heterodox interpretations of the Constitution of
1853/1860, the Argentine Supreme Court maintained the persuasive force
attached to the original rulings, while creating a new doctrine different
from the transplanted precedent. With this rhetorical maneuver, the Argen-
tine Supreme Court has awarded the President greater powers and has ulti-
mately altered the division of powers as laid down in the historical
Constitution. This new equilibrium of power was formally acknowledged
in the constitutional amendment of 1994. Of course, the mutation effect
could take place in other jurisdictions as well.
This paper also examines two lines of economic research on legal
transplantation. First, the so-called "LLSV paper" implies that developing
countries should transplant corporate and financial law from common law
jurisdictions, because this legal family affords stronger protection for in-
vestors (e.g. creditors and shareholders) than civil law.8 Though the LLSV
paper is only concerned with creditors' rights in corporate law, I interpret it
as arguing that, in general, common law provides greater protection for
investments than civil law, so that transplants from common law have a
greater chance to provide the right incentives for maximizing investment
and growth.
Second, Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Rich-
ard introduced the label "transplant effect" to describe the ineffectiveness
8. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1151 (1998) [hereinafter the LLSV paper]. For a criticism from a
Continental European perspective, see Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the
United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005).
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of legal transplants that result from insufficient local demand for the trans-
planted law. Local demand is often weak either because the transplanted
law has not been adapted to local conditions, or because the local popula-
tion is not familiar with the borrowed institution.9 The legal transplant is
only effective if it meets local demand and is well adapted to local condi-
tions.
In this paper, I will argue that the transplantation of judicial prece-
dents is exposed to the mutation effect, and that the mutation effect can
critically affect the conclusions that could be drawn both from the LLSV
and the transplant-effect papers. In the Argentine experience, the mutation
effect has played a persuasive role in altering the division of powers and
the protection of property as laid out in the original Constitution.
I. THE SUCCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTATION IN
ARGENTINA (1860-1930)
The Argentine experience in constitutional transplantation started with
the drafting of the Constitution, enacted in 1853 and put into full force in
1860. The drafter of the Argentine Constitution, Juan Bautista Alberdi,
borrowed extensively from the American Constitution in order to carry out
the Pampas Madison's political and economic program. The Argentine
Constitution copied the Preamble and various provisions from the U.S.
Constitution, and added other provisions that strengthened its commitment
to laissez-faire ideology. 10 Thus, both constitutions contain similar clauses
with respect to property rights. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion says that no persons shall be "deprived of... property, without due
process of law." It adds: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." The Argentine Constitution establishes in
Article 17: "Property is inviolable and no inhabitant of the Nation shall be
deprived of it but in virtue of a court decision founded on law. Expropria-
tion because of public utility must be so qualified by a law and previously
indemnified."' 1I As is clear, the protection of private property in the Argen-
tine Constitution is as robust as it is in the U.S. Constitution. Moreover,
9. Daniel M. Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 168 (2003).
10. See Alberto F. Garay, Federalism, the Judiciary, and Constitutional Adjudication in Argen-
tina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional Model, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.L. REv. 161, 162
(1991).
11. CONST. ARG. art. 17, available at http://www.argentina.gov.ar/argentina/portal/documentos/
constitucionnacional.pdf, translated in http://www.argentina.gov.ar/argentina/portalldocumentos/
constitucionjingles.pdf.
[Vol 83:1
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTS AND THE MUTATION EFFECT
Article 14 of the Argentine Constitution guarantees the right to "use and
dispose of property."
In both Argentina and the United States, private property encompasses
creditor rights arising out of contracts, such as bank deposits. In fact, this is
clearly the case in the U.S. Constitution as a result of the Contracts Clause
in Article I, Section 10. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
reliance interests are included in property.12 The Argentine constitutional
background is much the same. In effect, the Argentine Supreme Court has
declared that the term "property" covers "all interests a man can possess,
outside himself, his life, and liberty, as well as all rights that have a recog-
nized value, either emerging from private law relations or administrative
acts." 13
The transplantation of constitutional texts led to the borrowing of con-
stitutional precedents. From the 1880s thorough the mid-1890s, the Argen-
tine Supreme Court used American precedents as authoritative sources to
legitimize its decisions. 14 This experience in constitutional transplantation
was very successful until 1930, when the first military coup put an end to a
long period of constitutional stability.
The Argentine constitutional experience challenges skepticism about
constitutional transplantation. In fact, from 1860-1930, a period of seventy
years, Argentina had an astonishing record of economic and demographic
growth.15 This shows that constitutional transplantation can carry the day.
Of course, one could argue that constitutional transplantation was responsi-
ble for the long period of military interventions and political instability that
lasted from 1943 to 1983. But scientific rigor does not allow us to make
this claim by pointing to military intervention and political instability when
there have already been transplanted constitutional texts and precedents.
There are too many other relevant factors that stand in the way of this in-
ference. The ceteris paribus clauses involved in historical causal proposi-
12. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 13 (1992).
13. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/12/1925, "Bourdieu, Don Pedro Emilio v.
Municipalidad de la Capital / sobre devoluci6n de sumas de dinero," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1925-145-307, 327) (Arg.).
14. Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S. Constitutional
Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith, 46 AM.
U. L. REV 1483, 1546 (1997); see also Jonathan M. Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability:
A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 77,
79 (1997) [hereinafter Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability].
15. See Lee J. Alston & Andr6s A. Gallo, The Erosion of Checks and Balances in Argentina and
the Rise of Populism in Argentina: An Explanation ofArgentina's Economic Slide from the Top Ten 3-4
(Inst. of Behavioral Sci., Univ. of Colo., Working Paper No. PEC2005-0001, 2005), available at
http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/pubs/pec/pec2005-0001 .pdf.
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tions make it very difficult to isolate a single factor as the cause of stability
or instability. For instance, what was the role of the Law of Universal Suf-
frage, passed in 1912, in threatening powerful interest groups? What was
the role of the Great Depression? What ideological influence did European
totalitarian movements have in Argentina? All these factors could have
been relevant even in the presence of a wholly autochthonous constitution.
I believe that transplantation itself plays little role in political phenomena.
Institutional errors can happen with or without transplantation. In fact, be-
fore transplanting the U.S. model in 1853/1860, Argentina suffered a long
period of political instability which the locally-developed constitutions of
1819 and 1824 could not suppress.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC EMERGENCY
When under macroeconomic distress, it is natural to regard infringe-
ments of the freedom of contract and of private property as grounded in
public interest reasons. Indeed, resolving an emergency situation fits the
paradigm of serving the public interest. The idea of emergency allows indi-
vidual rights to be sacrificed when doing so is necessary to avert a social or
economic catastrophe. Emergency norms typically contradict "regular"
norms. This does not prevent the legal system from being coherent, how-
ever, because emergency norms suspend, for a period of time, the applica-
tion of "regular" norms. During the state of emergency, such norms are
authoritative-they still belong to the legal system-but their application is
suspended. 16 From a philosophical viewpoint, it is interesting to observe
that even natural rights theories could accept that it may be morally permis-
sible to infringe individual rights in emergency situations.17 Thus, Argen-
tine Judge and law professor Martin Farrell contends that utilitarian
considerations outweigh rights-based considerations when respecting indi-
vidual rights will lead to tragic consequences. While a judge's moral obli-
gation is to enforce rights, under conditions of political unrest or social
emergency, a judge can allow the infringement of individual rights if doing
so is necessary to avert tragic consequences.18
16. RICARDO V. GUARINONI, La Emergencia y los Jueces, in DERECHO, LENGUAJE Y L6GICA 90-
91 (2006).
17. Robert Nozick, author of the most important natural rights treatise of the twentieth century,
says: "The question of whether these side constraints [individual rights] are absolute, or whether they
may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure
might look like, is one I hope largely to avoid." ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30
n.* (1974).
18. Martin Diego Farrell, Los planes econ6micos y la Corte Suprema, FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO Y
ECONOMiA 17 (2006).
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During the 1920s and 1930s, the Argentine Supreme Court trans-
planted the doctrine of economic emergency from the U.S. Supreme Court
as an appropriate interpretation of the Argentine Constitution. 19 In the
landmark decision Avico v. de la Pesa, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a law passed in 1933 that established a three-year moratorium on
mortgage payments and foreclosures, and capped the interest rate at six
percent. 20 This decision transplanted the U.S. doctrines in Nebbia v. New
York 21 and Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.22 As is well known,
in Blaisdell a Minnesota statute imposed a limited moratorium on the fore-
closure of mortgages. James W. Ely describes the position of Chief Justice
Hughes, who spoke for the Court in Blaisdell:
Clearly influenced by the economic emergency, Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes ruled that contracts were subject to the reasonable exer-
cise of the state police power. The police power encompassed the author-
ity to give temporary relief for extraordinary economic distress.
Although susceptible of a narrow construction limiting valid impair-
ments of contracts to emergency situations, Hughes's opinion also sug-
gested in broad terms that the state's interest in regulating economic
affairs could justify interference with contracts. 23
In Avico, Attorney General Horacio L. Larreta created a four-
condition test using the requirements imposed in Blaisdell for a moratorium
to be constitutional: (1) the conditions existing must have created an emer-
gency situation; (2) the fundamental purpose of the measure, and of gov-
ernment acts in general, is to safeguard the public and promote general
welfare to the people; (3) the postponement of mortgage foreclosure sales
must be reasonable; and (4) the change in legislation must have been pro-
vided in a temporary manner. 24 Larreta also opined that a moratorium does
not violate the guarantee to property established in Article 17 of the Consti-
tution, but instead limits the right to use and dispose of property fixed in
19. See generally NARCISO J. LUGONES, ALBERTO F. GARAY, SERGIO 0. DUGO & SANTIAGO H.
CORCUERA, LEYES DE EMERGENCIA: DECRETOS DE NECESIDAD Y URGENCIA (1992); William C. Banks
& Alejandro D. Carrir, Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United
States, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993); Garay, supra note 10; Judicial Review and Constitutional Stabil-
ity, supra note 14; Rosenkrantz, supra note 4.
20. CSJN, 7/12/1934, "Avico, Don Oscar Agustin v. de la Pesa, don Sa61 G. / sobre consignacirn
de intereses," Fallos (1934-172-21) (Arg.), available at http://www.garridocordobera.com.ar/pagina-
nueva_572.htm.
21. 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934).
22. 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934).
23. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 121 (2d ed. 1998).
24. Avico, 172 Fallos at 34-35.
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Article 14, a right already subject to the restrictions established by laws
regulating its exercise. 25
Larreta maintained that "a moratorium does not attack property, which
is maintained with all its attributes, and only delays the application of the
remedies that are available to the creditor. '26 Following Blaisdell, judge
Roberto Repetto in his dissenting Avico opinion stressed the difference
between substance of property and remedies:
The State's intervention through the judiciary is necessary when law is
not fulfilled by men's voluntary compliance. In this case the State
awards creditors a remedy addressed to obtain performance of the obli-
gation by compulsory means in a judicial process. The right correlative
to the obligation and the remedy are two different rights. One thing is the
right to the object of the contract and quite another claiming State's co-
ercion through the remedy granted to the creditor by Art. 505 of the Civil
Code.... The remedy or action has not been created by the parties' con-
sent; it is prior to that consent and flows from the law-making will di-
rected to the enforcement of contractual transactions. 27
Thus, the doctrine in Blaisdell and Avico is that, for emergency rea-
sons, Congress may modify the "time dimension" of property rights, pro-
vided that its modification is reasonable. 28
III. FIRST MUTATION: THE CRISIS OF 1989
The Avico court's borrowing of the emergency paradigm would prove
very useful many decades later to sustain the constitutionality of emer-
gency decrees in financial crises. The most important decision in this area
came in the context of the economic crisis of 1989, in the early days of
President Menem's administration. Before implementing the Convertibility
Plan, President Menem issued Decree 36/90, which converted time deposits
into public bonds (the 1989 Bonos Externos de la Repfiblica Argentina, or
BONEX). The publicized goal of the measure was to reduce the burden of
the increasing internal public debt. In the famous Peralta v. Naci6n Argen-
tina decision,29 the Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional valid-
ity of Decree 36/90 by invoking the doctrine used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Blaisdell, which had been transplanted into Argentine law various
decades earlier in Avico. The Court defined "emergency" in Peralta as
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 88-89 (Repetto, J., dissenting).
28. For a four-dimensional analysis of property in which time is the fourth dimension, see LAURA
S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER ch. 2 (2003).
29. CSJN, 27/12/1990, "Peralta, Luis Arcenio v. Naci6n Argentina / acci6n de amparo," Fallos
(1990-313-1513) (Arg.).
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referring to "an extraordinary situation that hovers over the economic-
social order, with its burden of accumulated troubles, in the form of scar-
city, poverty, penury or indigence, and creates a state of necessity which
must be put to an end."'30
The Court's decision in Peralta exemplifies the mutation effect in that
it openly inflated the emergency paradigm as set in Blaisdell and Avico. In
fact, the Court in Peralta discussed two different issues: (1) whether the
President possesses emergency powers of a legislative nature, and (2)
whether the relevant authority (Congress or the President) can, in a state of
emergency, defer the paying out of deposits by restructuring them into
public bonds. Indeed, there are two possible sides to the doctrine of eco-
nomic emergency: functional emergency and regulatory emergency. Func-
tional emergency means that the state of emergency can justify an
alteration of the separation of powers established by the Constitution, so
that the President can exercise, with or without Congress's prior approval,
abilities "normally" reserved to Congress. Regulatory emergency, on the
other hand, refers to the government's wider powers of regulatory interfer-
ence with constitutional rights that are grounded on the need to protect
fundamental aggregate goals (e.g. the preservation of the whole constitu-
tional order).
As regards the regulatory emergency, Peralta apparently rested on the
doctrines used in Blaisdell and Avico:
In our law as well as in that of the United States of America, the laws
dictated in emergency situations have not been taken to be outside the
Federal Constitution in disregard of the right to property, when they ei-
ther limited themselves to not suspending indefinitely the exercise of the
creditor's rights, or did not make difficult the fulfillment of the obliga-
tions with excessively long terms. 31
But Peralta equated a congressional moratorium (the measure chal-
lenged in Blaisdell and Avico) to a financial restructuring scheme intro-
duced by presidential decree, thus "stretching" the borrowed precedent
from a regulatory emergency to a functional emergency.
The mutation of the doctrine of economic emergency in Peralta took
an additional direction. As we saw above, Blaisdell made a crucial distinc-
tion between the nature of an obligation (e.g. a creditor's right) and the
remedies available to obtain its execution. Peralta only paid lip service to
this doctrine:
When for necessity reasons, [the State] promulgates a norm that does not
deprive private individuals of legitimately recognized patrimonial bene-
30. Id. at 1549.
31. Id. at 1548-49.
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fits or withhold their property and only temporarily limits the receipt of
such benefits or restricts the use that one could make of that property,
there is no violation of Article 17 of the National Constitution, but a
limitation imposed by the necessity of attenuating or overcoming a cri-
sis. 32
In fact, the compulsory swap of deposits for public bonds altered the
substance of the obligations, thus violating the right to property. 33 The
emergency doctrine permits deferral of the available remedies under situa-
tions of crisis when the deferral (e.g. a moratorium) is a necessary means
for overcoming the crisis, but it disallows an alteration, even temporarily,
of the nature of the underlying obligations. A compulsory swap for gov-
ernment bonds modifies the essence of an obligation because, among other
things, it substitutes the government for the original obligor.
Finally, Peralta assimilated a short-term moratorium in Blaisdell (just
over two years) and Avico (three years) to a ten-year banking restructuring
(the "BONEX Plan"). By stretching the borrowed precedent in all these
ways, the Court concluded that the President has an emergency power to
postpone for ten years the lawful exercise of property rights. This post-
ponement does not require compensation. Peralta paradigmatically repre-
sents the mutation effect. By inserting President Menem's decree of
expropriation of bank deposits within the doctrine of economic emergency,
the Court could imply that it was following U.S. precedents, even though
the facts in Blaisdell were quite different from those in Peralta.
IV. SECOND MUTATION: THE MEGACRISIS OF 2001
The Argentine crisis of 2001 had catastrophic effects on the country's
economy.34 On November 30, overnight interest rates in pesos averaged
689% on fears of devaluation and deposit freeze, and the "bank run" accel-
erated at high speed. On December 1, 2001, the government announced a
bank deposit freeze. By Decree 1,570/2001, Section 2, the government
prohibited cash withdrawals of more than two hundred and fifty pesos or
two hundred and fifty dollars per week by any holder or holders from the
total balance of the bank accounts opened with each financial entity. On
December 19th and 20th, respectively, Minister Cavallo and then-President
32. Id. at 1554.
33. MARTA MACiAS, REVISION DEL FALLO BUSTOS SEGU N LA DOCTRINA DE SUS PRECEDENTES:
ANALISIS DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA CITADA EN EL VOTO DE LOS DRES. BELLUSCIO Y MAQUEDA (2005)
(Arg.), available at LexisNexis Argentina, Doc. No. 0003/011625 or 0003/011629.
34. In fact, GDP fell 28%, and unemployment rose from 18.3% in 2001 to 23.6% in 2002. Poverty
rate rose from 25.9% in 1998 to 38.3% in 2001 and 57.5% in 2002. For a helpful narrative of the Ar-
gentine crisis, see JOINT ECON. COMM., 108TH CONG., ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND
CURES (2003) (Jim Saxton, Vice Chairman), http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/06-13-031ong.pdf.
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De la Rua resigned in the middle of great social and political turmoil. Then,
between December 20th and December 31st, interim presidents Ramon
Puerta, Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, and Eduardo Camahio took office. On Janu-
ary 1, 2002, Eduardo Duhalde was appointed President by the two Houses
of Congress. On January 6, Congress enacted the Public Emergency and
Exchange Regulations Reform Law 25,561 (called "the Emergency Law"),
which ended the "convertibility" monetary system that had been in effect
since 1991. This law also applied the exchange rate of Arg. $1 per U.S. $1
for a certain group of debts with financial entities not exceeding the sum of
U.S.$100,000, including mortgage and individual loans. On January 9, by
Decree 71/2002, President Duhalde devalued the Argentine Peso to 1.40
per dollar for certain transactions, and established a managed, floating sys-
tem for the rest of operations and transactions. Later, on February 4, the
President issued Decree 214/2002, pursuant to which all bank deposits
were "pesified" at $1.40 per dollar, and reprogrammed at various time pe-
riods. The order also provided for the application of an index of inflation-
ary correction (the CER) to all rescheduled bank deposits. Because Decree
214/2002 "pesified" loans with the financial system at $1.00 per dollar-a
measure that greatly benefited local and foreign corporations-the overall
system was known as "asymmetric pesification." Successive decrees and
lower norms gave depositors the ability to obtain government bonds for the
difference between the official and the free exchange rate. On May 31,
Decree 905/2002 awarded depositors the option to swap all rescheduled
deposits for government bonds in U.S. dollars (called BODENs); deposi-
tors who did not opt for the swap were given certificates of rescheduled
deposits (called CEDROs). Finally, Decree 1836/2002 granted depositors
various options to swap all or part of Cedros for government bonds. 35 The
obvious goal of both decrees was to put 2001 depositors at a position no
worse than those under the BONEX Plan.
Depositors perceived all these measures as confiscations of their assets
and started a massive social and political mobilization involving assaults on
banks, popular assemblies, and demonstrations. Judicialization of the pro-
test was incredibly quick, especially after the judicial holiday of January
2002. By April 2002, the Attorney General reported that 210,188 injunc-
tions ("amparos") were filed in the federal justice system against the sus-
pension of cash payments ("corralito") and the freezing and pesification of
35. For a detailed account of all normative changes, see Gabriel G6mez Giglio, Argentine Su-
preme Court of Justice Confirms Pesification of Bank Deposits, 22 J. INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 224,
224-27 (2007); Gabriel G6mez Giglio, Argentina and the Changing Nature of Financial Regulation, 19
J. INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 317 (2004); Gabriel G6mez Giglio, Emergency Law and Financial Entities
in Argentina, 18 J. INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 397 (2003).
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deposits ("corral6n").36 Federal and provincial courts throughout the coun-
try allowed cautionary exceptional measures, often decided inaudita parte,
that compelled banks to return deposited sums in U.S. dollars to plaintiffs
without deciding the substantive issues.37
Doctrinally, it could be thought that the Court would follow the
Peralta decision in testing the constitutional validity of the various emer-
gency measures taken. In fact, when President de la Rua suspended the
convertibility of both demand and time deposits into cash by Decree
1,570/2001, the Court initially held that exceptional cautionary measures
(amparos) were illegal because they violated procedural due process. 38
However, a few weeks later, the Court decided in Smith to adjudge the
substance of the case and struck down the decree. 39 Still under the sway of
the emergency paradigm and its underlying property/public interest matrix,
the "Menem Court" ruled that restrictions on bank withdrawals and the
establishment of a new monetary policy amounted to confiscation of prop-
erty. The Smith decision represents a curious return to Lochner-type juris-
prudence. Thus, the Court declared:
The right to freely dispose of the funds invested or deposited with bank-
ing and financial institutions is based on constitutional principles, regard-
less of any other legal standards acknowledging it. It is clear that any
condition or restriction on such right will affect the intangibility of prop-
erty and impair the goal of promoting justice. Such clashes with constitu-
tional principles, given their seriousness and the absence of crucial
reasons for them, cannot be understood as the result of reasonable regu-
lations based on such principles, nor do they arise from Article 28 of the
Constitution (Decisions 305:945, par. 8, last paragraph). This is clearly
the case of the situation at stake in the case sub lite, in which successive
regulations went too far, imposing conditions and restrictions on the free
disposal of private property that flagrantly violated the said constitu-
tional principles. 40
The Court made an attempt to distinguish the facts in Smith from those
in Peralta by resorting to the doctrine of "vested rights":
In the light of the case law criteria mentioned above [vested rights
cases], the plaintiffs property has been violated, given that the deposits
36. Catalina Smulovitz, Judicialization of Protest in Argentina: The Case of Corralito, in
ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW: SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NEW LATIN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACIES 55, 60 (Enrique Peruzzotti & Catalina Smulovitz eds., 2006).
37. Hector A. Mairal, El Derecho en Tiempos de C6lera, ACTUALIDAD JURiDICA URIA &
MENtNDEZ, Nov. 2002, at 9, 20.
38. CSJN, 28/12/2001, "Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires / medidas cautelares," Fallos (2001-
324-4520, 4526-27) (Arg.) [hereinafter Kiper case].
39. CSJN, 1/2/2002, "Smith, Carlos Antonio v. P.E.N. / medidas cautelares," Fallos (2002-325-
28) (Arg.).
40. Id. at 38-39.
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had been made while a system guaranteeing their inviolability was in
force. Furthermore, such guarantee had been recently strengthened by
Law 25466, which had declared deposits intangible, with intangibility
being defined as the impossibility by the State to alter the conditions
agreed upon by deposit holders and the financial institution, as well as
the prohibition to swap deposits for State bonds, postpone payments, or
restructure their maturity (Sect. I to 4); these circumstances did, in fact,
exceed those described in the Peralta case recorded in Fallos313:1513.4 1
Thus, it might be thought that the Court considered the suspension of
deposits' intangibility by Emergency Law 25561 as a new circumstance
that was absent when it decided the Kiper case.
There is little doubt, however, that Menem's appointees in the Court
were mainly guided by political factors. In Smith, these judges (usually
called the "automatic majority" because they generally voted en bloc in
favor of the President's policies) made a preemptive strike to deter Du-
halde's impeachment plans by challenging his economic policies. Thus, it
can be asserted that Smith must be given an externalist explanation, that is,
an explanation that is not premised on judicial or doctrinal reasoning, but
on political influences. 42 Apart from the political background of the deci-
sion, widely documented in Argentine newspapers, two reasons support
this claim. First, it is difficult to explain why the Court decided to adjudi-
cate the substantive question of law in Smith while it had declined to do so
on in the Kiper case. The reason the Court invoked in Smith is not persua-
sive: "[T]he injunction requested and granted matches the object of the
appeal. '43 In fact, the plaintiffs in both the Kiper case and in Smith claimed
cautionary injunctions through amparos. Second, as Horacio M. Lynch
acutely observes, it is ironic that after decades of validating the most di-
verse invasions of private property and contractual freedom, such as mini-
mum prices, rent control legislation, freezing of deposits, and so on, the
Supreme Court would suddenly return to a Lochner-type conception of
private property and freedom of contract. 44
41. Id. at 39-40.
42. For a description of the intemalist/extemalist divide, and an internalist explanation of Supreme
Court decisions during the New Deal that separates them from President Roosevelt's "Court-packing"
plan, see generally Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM.
HIST. REV. 1052 (2005).
43. Smith, 325 Fallos at 34.
44. Horacio M. Lynch, Emergencia, Derecho, Justicia y Seguridad Juridica (Reflexiones Sobre la
Crisis y las Libertades Econ6micas), Revista Juridica Argentina-La Ley [L.L.], May 29-30, 2002, at
1287.
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In Provincia de San Luis, 4 5 the last case on pesification decided one
year later by the so-called "automatic majority," the Supreme Court re-
stated the fundamental doctrines in Smith. The Court held that pesification
of bank deposits went beyond the emergency powers because it altered the
substance of the depositors' property rights, instead of simply putting off
the remedies available to depositors. Justices Eduardo Molin6 O'Connor
and Guillermo A. F. L6pez placed great emphasis on Intangibility Law No
25466 because, they declared, this law strengthened the constitutional pro-
tection of depositors' vested rights. The judges held that "the energetic
wording of those norms uncontroversially reveals the existence of an eco-
nomic policy addressed to capture deposits, creating for such purpose a
high degree of trust, which public power defrauded almost immediately
with the passing of those norms here questioned. '46 The Court ordered
Banco de la Naci6n Argentina ("the Nation") to pay off the dollar deposits
to Provincia de San Luis ("the Province"), but also instructed the Nation
and the Province to agree on the method and dates of repayment within
sixty days, without modifying the substance of the decision, under penalty
of the Court's deciding the issues itself.
In 2004, a divided Court (under a partially renovated personnel ap-
pointed by President Kirchner) overruled Smith and Provincia de San Luis
and sustained the constitutionality of pesification in Bustos.47 In Bustos, the
majority of the Court went back to the doctrines in Avico and Blaisdell, that
is, to the emergency doctrine, which permits the impairment of property
rights and the obligation of contracts on the grounds of public interest un-
der a state of emergency. Thus, according to Bustos, in a state of emer-
gency Congress or the President may establish the compulsory conversion
of U.S. dollar-denominated bank deposits into Argentine pesos at an offi-
cial exchange rate.
Justices Augusto Belluscio and Juan Carlos Maqueda deemed Smith
an "unfortunate" decision. They also offered a critical assessment of the
economic policies adopted in the 1990s:
Thus, it is evident that the prolonged maintenance of an artificial value
equivalence between the Argentine peso and the U.S. dollar, together
with economic circumstances that the mentioned absence of evidence
impedes to clarify, led to a process of worsening of the national produc-
tive apparatus-with its aftermath of unemployment, misery and hun-
45. CSJN, 5/3/2003, "Provincia de San Luis v. Estado Nacional / amparo," Fallos (2003-326-417)
(Arg.).
46. Id. § 37.
47. CSJN, 26/10/2004, "Bustos, Alberto Roque v. Estadio Nationale / amparo," J.A. (2005-IIi-
189) (Arg.) (judges Augusto C. Belluscio, Juan C. Maqueda, Antonio Boggiano, Eugenio R. Zaffaroni
and Elena Highton de Holasco concurring).
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ger-to which the unusual interest rates offered for dollar deposits were
relevant, to a threat of bank run that the Government tried to avert by
means of these rates, and finally to a certain risk that that threat really
should occur or start, which were the determinants of the measures
adopted by the Executive Branch and the Congress with the goal of im-
peding the generalized insolvency of the banking system and the subse-
quent ruin of the set of depositors.48
Belluscio and Maqueda availed themselves once again of Larreta's
four-condition test and ruled that, in the absence of contrary evidence, the
conditions must be considered as met.
Today, the Court holds to this doctrine, though most federal courts
still follow Smith and Provincia de San Luis. In the recent Massa decision,
the Court again applied the emergency paradigm. 49 It ruled that applying
the conversion formula established by Decree 214/2002-in an extended
version that also covers the period of legal proceedings-plus an annual
interest rate fixed at four percent, does not cause economic damage when
restitution is made at the time of the decision. Justices Elena I. Highton de
Nolasco, E. Ra,6l Zaffaroni, and Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti stated:
[A]n interpretation contrary to this fundamental regime of economic
working [the "emergency legislative bloc," which includes the new ex-
change system], if adopted years after the implementation of this regime,
would yield very grave institutional sequels, which is contrary to the in-
terpretative standard that requires to ponder over the consequences that
result from judicial decisions. 50
It is important to notice that in Bustos and Massa, the Court applied
the doctrine of emergency in a mutated form. In fact, the conversion of
dollar deposits into rescheduled pesos deposits in 2002 (even considering
the option to swap deposits for dollar-denominated government bonds)
altered the substance of the obligations, and did not merely postpone the
available remedies. The same applies to the conversion of bank deposits
into pesos at an "official" rate, because it modifies the economic value of
the deposit. 51
Bustos and Massa also represent a second form of mutation of the
doctrine of economic emergency, because Congress (or the President acting
under congressional delegation) now has the power to change the currency
denomination of financial contracts, including demand deposits. Under
48. Id. § 8.
49. CSJN, 27/12/2006, "Massa, Juan Augustin v. Poder Ejecutivo National - Decreto No.
1.570/01 / amparo," J.A. (2007-1-187) (Arg.).
50. Id. at 189 (judges Elena Highton de Nolasco, E. Rafjl Zaffaroni, Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti and
Carmen Argibay concurring).
51. This opinion was expressed by Justice Carmen Argibay of the Argentine Supreme Court in her
vote in the Massa case. Id. at 192-97 (Argibay, J., concurring).
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Peralta, the President could substitute U.S. dollar-denominated bonds for
U.S. dollar-denominated time deposits. According to Bustos and Massa, the
government can convert both time and demand-dollar deposits into re-
scheduled pesos deposits. Arguably, the President can exert this emergency
power without prior congressional authorization.
CONCLUSION
We saw that the Argentine Court declared in Peralta and Bustos-
Massa that it was following the doctrine in Blaisdell and its Argentine ana-
logue (Avico). If Peralta and Bustos-Massa involve such doctrinal changes,
why has the Court maintained that it was following Blaisdell-Avico? The
mutation effect says that this declaration played a rhetorical function in the
Court's discourse-it sought to retain the persuasive force of Blaisdell and
Avico in concluding that the Argentine Constitution allows the expropria-
tions of deposits (a very heterodox interpretation of the constitutional text).
The fact that judicial borrowing plays a persuasive function is undeni-
able. In this context, it is interesting to note how the Argentine Supreme
Court defended the borrowing of U.S. precedents in Avico:
Our Constitution, in adopting to a great extent the principles of the Con-
stitution of the United States of America, has given us the great advan-
tage, among others, of putting at our disposal the wise interpretation of
their Supreme Court with respect to the principles that we have adopted.
The guarantee to property established in Article 17 of the National Con-
stitution has its antecedent in the Amendments to the American Constitu-
tion. It is then of the utmost interest to study how the American Supreme
Court has construed the nature, extension and limits of this guarantee,
with the purpose of also adopting it, if its foundations are reasonable, as
the most authentic and wise interpretation of the principle that we have
adopted in our own Constitution. 52
By the same token, mutated transplanted doctrines can also play a use-
ful persuasive function. Persuasion might proceed along these lines: If the
U.S. Supreme Court accepts compulsory modification of contracts when
the country is under macroeconomic distress, why could the Argentine
Supreme Court not accept expropriation of financial assets under similar
conditions? Or, if the U.S. (an advanced capitalist country) accepts limita-
tions on these institutions, why should Argentina not do the same? By ap-
plying U.S. precedents to vindicate expropriations, the Court seems to say:
"We cannot be more Catholic than the Pope."
52. CSJN, 7/12/1934, "Avico, Don Oscar Agustin v. de la Pesa, don Saful G . sobre consignaci6n
de intereses," Fallos (1934-172-21, 40) (Arg.).
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When the Argentine Supreme Court extended the emergency prece-
dents to cover expropriations of financial assets, it omitted any reference to
the frequency of the precedents' application, probably because making
explicit the frequency of application would affect the persuasive force of
the borrowed precedent. Yet there is a striking difference between applying
a rule of expropriation once every hundred years and once every ten years.
Because frequency of application is often considered exogenous to law, the
Argentine Supreme Court could claim that it provides the same degree of
property protection as the American Supreme Court. As is obvious, how-
ever, background is as relevant as formal rules when it comes to assessing
the strength of an institution. Property protection should be measured by
considering both formal law and "law in action. ' '53
An additional conclusion is also worth mentioning. The transplanta-
tion of the doctrine of economic emergency runs afoul the general implica-
tions of the LLSV and transplant effect papers. First, transplantation from a
common law jurisdiction (i.e. the United States) has not afforded stronger
protection to investors (i.e. bank depositors). Second, though the local de-
mand for the borrowed precedents was very high, the transplant was largely
ineffective. Local demand was very high because U.S. constitutional law
has been well known in Argentina since the drafting of the Argentine Con-
stitution, and because the emergency doctrine seems admirably adapted to a
country that has had so many economic crises. However, transplantation of
U.S. judicial precedents has not been effective in developing a robust bank-
ing system. In 2005, Argentines had as much as U.S. $108.5 million depos-
ited abroad or kept outside the banking system.54
53. For this distinction, see ALF Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 17-24 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 2004) (1959).
54. Alejandro Rebossio, Se Fren6 la Fuga de Capitales en 2004, LA NACI6N, Mar. 23, 2005, at 1,
available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/689799.
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